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INSURANCE - WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
The insured had taken out a conventional automobile liability
policy which restricted the authority- of the agent to waive or
change any part of the policy or to estop the company from assert-
ing any right under the terms of the policy which was accepted
by the insured. The policy was "notice" to the insured of all its
terms. The insurer's agent had knowledge that one automobile
covered by the policy was owned by the insured's wife, notwith-
standing a declaration in the policy that the named insured was
the sole owner of all automobiles therein listed. Held, that the
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insurer was not estopped from denying liability under the policy.
Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Woody et al., 47 F. Supp. 327
(D. N. J. 1942).
The distinctions between waiver and estoppel are set out
very ably by Mr. Richards in his works on Insurance where he
says, "The words waiver and estoppel are often used interchange-
ably by the courts. There is, however, a real distinction. Waiver
is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. It involves
the idea of assent, and assent is an act of understanding. This
presupposes that the person to be affected has knowledge of his
rights, but does not wish to assert them. Intention to relinquish
must appear, but acts and conduct inconsistent with intention to
terminate the conract are sufficient. The rule is applicable that
no one shall be permitted to deny that he intended the natural
consequences of his acts and conduct. Estoppel rests upon the
misleading conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other.
Estoppel involves the acts and conduct of both parties and in-
quiry always is as to whether or not the fault of one party has in-
duced the other in reliance thereon to alter his position to his detri-
ment." Richards, Law of Insurance (4th Ed.) para, 106; Bern-
hard v. Rochester German Insurance Co., 79 Conn. 392, 65 Atl.
134, 8 Ann. Cas. 298; Vance, On Insurance (2d. Ed.) p. 459.
"An insurance company is not estopped from setting up the
breach of warranty of an existing fact contained in a policy even
though the company, through its agent, knew of the true fact
at the time the policy was issued." Northern Assurance Co. v.
Grand View Building Association, 183 U. S. 308, 46 L. Ed. 213,
22 S. Ct. 133 (1901). This rule is contra to the decisions of nearly
every state in the Union which has had the occasion to pass upon
the question.
"The restrictions inserted in the contract upon the power of
the agent to waive any condition, unless done in a particular man-
ner, cannot be deemed to apply to those conditions which relate to
the inception of the contract, when it appears that the agent has
delivered it and received the premiums with full knowledge of
the actual situation. To take the benefit of a contract with full
knowledge of all the facts, and attempt afterwards to defeat it,
when called upon to perform, by asserting conditions relating to
those facts, would be to claim that no contract was made, and thus
operate as a fraud upon the other party." Wood v. American Fire
Insurance Co., 149 N. Y. 382, 44 N. E. 80, 52 A. St. Rep. 733
(1896). This rule is followed by North Dakota. Leisen v. St.
Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co., 20 N. D. 216, 127 N. W. 837, 30
L. R. A. (NS) (1910). The overwhelming weight of authority
supports the view taken by these courts. The cases supporting
this contention are found on page 327 of Volume 20 of the North
Dakota Reports.
"The issue of a policy by an insurance company, with a full
knowledge or notice of all the facts affecting its validity, is tanta-
mount to an assertion that the policy is valid at the time of its
delivery, and is a waiver of the known ground of invalidity."
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Dwelling House Insurance Co. v. Brodie, 52 Ark. 11, 11 S. W. 1016,
4 L. R. A. 458 (1889).
"The information given to the agent operated as notice to the
company, and it having accepted the premium and assumed the
risk, it must be held that the company has waived the condition,
or if not, it is estopped from urging its breach as a defense. To
permit such a defense would be highly unjust and iniquitous. It
would shock the sense of right and fair dealing to permit money
to be obtained under such assurances, and to permit the company
to say, we are not bound, and did not intend, on our part, to be
bound for any loss that might occur; we misled and deceived you
into paying the premium, and although we did not intend to be
bound, and knew we were not, still we will keep the premium,
and you must suffer the loss. This is the substance of the de-
fense and such a defense cannot be allowed to prevail." St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Wells, 89 Ill. 82 (1876).
This writer is of the opinion that the court would have been
justified in decreeing that the insurer was estopped from denying
liability under the policy. In the case under discussion the fed-
eral court was bound to apply the law of the state where the con-
tract was consummate and which happened to be New Jersey. It
is highly probable that if the same court were trying an identical
case and applying North Dakota law that the result would be con-
tra to the NewJersey decisicn and in accord with the rule laid
down in North Dakota and a majority of the state courts.
TELMAR E. ROLSTAD
Law Student
University of North Dakota.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Osage National Bank, a National Banking Corporation, Pltf. and
Respt., vs. Oakes Special School District, a Public Corporation, Deft. and
AppIt.
That where the Legislature, under the State Constitution, had the
power to authorize a school district to increase its debt limit upon secur-
ing the assent of a majority of the voters voting at an election held within
the district, it could by retrospective legislation validate an indebtedness
of a district which at the time it was incurred, was within the limit the
Legislature had power to authorize and to which limit the electors of the
district had assented at an election, which, though previously unauthorized,
was such a proceeding that it would have constituted a valid election had
it had prior legislative sanction.
That Chapter 278, Laws of North Dakota 1923 is, for the reasons
stated in the opinion, held to validate certain warrants issued by the de-
fendant.
Appeal from the District Court of Dickey County, Hon. W. H. Hutch-
inson, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In State of North Dakota, Respt., vs. W. F. McClelland, Deft. and Applt.
That the right to a new trial is purely statutory and a trial court has
no jurisdiction to entertain or grant a motion for a new trial noticed for
